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Abstract  
Sale of illicit drugs through online ‘cryptomarkets’ is a notable innovation in the 
illicit drug market. Cryptomarkets present new ways of configuring risk and harm 
in relation to drug use. I examine the kinds of knowledge and discourses users 
employed to do this. Following Zinn (2008), I argue that the lay/expert divide that 
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creates a hierarchy of knowledge around drug use and harms is increasingly un-
dermined by the creation of knowledge communities by drug users who make 
drug use work effectively for them. I draw on the discussion forum of a now de-
funct English language focused cryptomarket, anonymised as ‘Merkat’, collected 
between 2015-16. Typically, vendors in the major cryptomarkets are based in the 
USA, UK, China, the Netherlands and Australia (van Buskirk, et al. 2016). Buyers 
were mainly located in the USA, UK, Australia and Western Europe (Winstock and 
Barratt, 2017). I scraped the market forum threads and coded on emergent 
themes. I found that risk worked along four axes, cultural normalisation/patholo-
gisation, chemical potency, legal/policy and market, each of which required a set 
of practices and orientations to manage successfully. Users indicated that they 
had adapted many harm reduction practices, while also promoting a ‘responsible 
harm’ orientation where they sought to own and take charge of harm. The sup-
port infrastructure drew on knowledge from drug users, vendors and interested 
professionals. I conclude that cryptomarkets can provide a community infrastruc-
ture that supports the exchange of drugs and configures them as risky but man-
ageable objects. 
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Introduction 
In this article, I examine the kinds of knowledge and practices users employed to 
identify and minimise the risks associated with their use of illicit drugs purchased 
through online cryptomarkets. These are a novel set of online markets for the ex-
change of illicit drugs along with other goods and services. I draw on data from a 
now defunct cryptomarket to examine how users talked about risk and their 
strategies for managing the different types of risk associated with sourcing drugs 
on the cryptomarket. I examine strategies being developed to mange and under-
stand risk in terms of how harm is reconfigured in a way that is relatable and 
graspable for them. 
The cryptomarkets, drugs and risk 
The internet is a growing medium for the purchase of illicit drugs and for peer-
to-peer sharing of information about drug types, effective use and safety (Barratt, 
2011). Ideas of harm are implicit in many research fields concerned with illicit 
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drugs and risk such as public health and criminology. Although often individual-
ised as a personal trouble, harm is increasingly recognised as structurally distrib-
uted and experienced (Rhodes, 1997, 2002, 2009). To extend this debate, I want 
to examine harm as a construct towards which drug users act and that they cre-
ate through the systems they use to buy and discuss drugs. So harm becomes an 
active object rather than just a potential negative outcome to be avoided. I ex-
amine strategies being developed to mange and understand risk to a novel set of 
online markets for the exchange of illicit drugs, the cryptomarkets in terms of 
how harm is reconfigured in a way that is relatable and graspable for them.  
Risk is meaningful, communicative and identity forming (Brown, 2014). I approach 
it as constructive of the kind of citizen we are encouraged to be. The ideal of the 
self-managed citizen is promoted in platform capitalism (Pasquale, 2017; Pereira 
and Scott, 2016). All kinds of behaviour become quantified, informationalised, 
mined, performed and commodified through the data infrastructure (Lupton, 
2016). However this does not reduce uncertainty. It creates new measures of so-
cial and political worth towards which people are enjoined and impelled to act 
(Beer, 2016; Lupton, 2015) and which create new uncertainties.  
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The data infrastructure is presented as creating knowledge (of one’s health, 
friends, work prospects and so on) while in fact creating a radical incompleteness. 
Nobody can measure up to the ideal, or know exactly what that ideal is. That is a 
deliberate choice in the way the infrastructure has been created. It is both privat-
ised (the data is harvested and jealously guarded by the private platforms that 
constitute most of the internet) and nationalised (national governments seek to 
make it accessible to themselves as in the case of the activities of the US Na-
tional Security Agency). It creates new dangers (such as coordinated harassment 
and leaking of personal data).  In response some users have sought to create and 
adapt software and hardware infrastructures that will allow them to manage and 
control social, personal, legal and cyber-risk, of which the darknet is one example 
. 
The darknet is a set of system relays and encryption protocols that disguises the 
origin, content and destination of internet traffic. The most prominent of these is 
the Tor (The Onion Router) network. It was developed so that citizens, particularly 
of repressive regimes, could communicate and browse the internet anonymously 
(Çalışkan et al, 2015). It can also host hidden ‘onion services’, a function for which 
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it has become better known, to the chagrin of some Tor supporters. Paired with 
the peer to peer payment system Bitcoin, onion services allow people to ex-
change goods and services without their transactions being cleared through any 
financial institution or exposed to any external surveillance. This function first 
came to prominence with the launch of the Silk Road site in 2011 (Aldridge and 
Décary-Hétu, 2014; Barratt et al, 2014b). Illicit drugs amounted to around 70% of 
listings on the site (Martin, 2014). Following the closure of Silk Road by law en-
forcement in 2013 numerous other markets have sprung up, been closed down 
and replaced again (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017). The overall cryptomarket 
structure is dynamic with many new markets coming online, which encourages 
vendors to set up accounts across multiple markets (Broséus et al., 2016). New 
markets typically offer special deals to established vendors such as importing 
their existing vendor rating and feedback, or a waiver of the normal vendor bond 
required on setting up a vendor account. Vendors can be connected across mar-
kets if they choose to use the same encryption key (Décary-Hétu and Quessy-
Doré, 2017). 
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These innovations allow for a modicum of stability across different markets. There 
is also a growing number of single vendor shops, some little more than Tor on-
ion site pages with contact information. Research has highlighted the potential of 
cryptomarkets as harm reducing mostly in terms of supply, drug quality, provision 
of harm reduction information and reducing conflict and predation (Aldridge et al 
2017; Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016). Availability of drugs on cryptomarkets 
has varied effects on the markets and users, depending on their location, social 
networks and drug use history. Some users temporarily indulge in a sweetie-shop 
approach, testing a wider range of drugs than they had available to them on the 
face-to-face markets before settling down to a range of preferred drugs. Well 
connected users sometimes move into small scale dealing, using the cryptomar-
kets to buy in bulk. As Barratt et al put it: 
 as the social reference group people identify with changes, infor-
mation and supply flows also change, and new drugs and drug prac-
tices become both more physically, socially and psychologically availa-
ble. (2016b: p. 6) 
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The development of cryptomarkets alters risk patterns and practices alter as well 
as the meaning attached to drug use. 
Multiple harms cohere around drug use, not all of which are directly related to 
the drug itself. Stigma, exclusion, legal risks and multiple risk vectors can be 
traced to the cultural social, political and economic contexts of drug use. For ex-
ample, the context of heroin use might involve potential harms such as overdoses 
and vein damage, the risks needed to obtain the drug and use it, and the 
tradeoffs with others, the need to manage relationships with partners, children, 
social services, and avoid police and other surveillance (Rhodes, 2002). There is 
not then a simple calculus of harm in the drug market because there is no agree-
ment between legislators, law enforcement, researchers, health workers, dealers 
and users about the origin and nature of those harms.  
Zinn’s (2008, 2016) concept of  ‘in-betweenness’; between expert rationality and 
lay irrationality, provides a way of thinking about the context cryptomarkets oper-
ate in. The established lay/expert distinction does not make very much sense 
when expert knowledge is quite limited, particularly of cryptomarkets, and users 
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themselves access and develop expertise and make decisions about the distribu-
tion of harm reduction material (Aldridge et al, 2017). My aim in this paper is to 
explore the types of knowledge evident in cryptomarkets and the ways they are 
used to manage risk 
Methodology 
In this article I draw on data from a qualitative study of the motivations and ex-
periences of cryptomarket users. In this study, I examined the dynamics of cryp-
tomarkets and the kinds of information available to users to make decisions 
about drug purchase and use. I chose one cryptomarket to study which I have 
anonymised as ‘Merkat’. It was until 2016 one of the larger markets when it was 
,'temporarily' suspended by its administrators. Like many cryptomarkets, Merkat 
had a large and active forum where users discussed drug qualities, drug effects, 
and the reliability or otherwise of various vendors. The variety of drugs discussed 
and the different situations and perspectives forum users brought to the discus-
sions made Merkat’s forum an ideal platform to use. I asked permission from the 
forum organiser to conduct research. No reply was received. I decided to go 
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ahead with the research because the forum was open access and did not have 
any rules explicitly prohibiting  researchers from using forum posts.  
Although direct demographic data is not available on Merkat users, it is possible 
to  infer from the geographical locations vendors commonly ship to in studies of 
the major cryptomarkets that they are based in the USA, UK, China, the Nether-
lands and Australia (van Buskirk, et al. 2016). From the kinds of idioms used by 
participants that they are mainly native English speaking, and that vendors are 
primarily based in the US, UK and Australia with some in other Western European 
countries  (Winstock and Barratt, 2017). This is also typical of cryptomarket users 
who participated in the Global Drug Survey (Barratt et al 2017). Compared to the 
participants in Winstock’s  (2017) survey of drug users, the users in the crypto-
markets were younger (24 years compared to 40 years), largely male (87% male 
compared to 67%) and more active in the clubbing scene. 
As I wanted to focus on the breadth and depth of users’ orientations to risk and 
harm,  I automatically copied data from the forums running back to the inception 
of the market in 2014. To analyse the data I imported it into Nvivo and used 
hand and automatic coding. I chose Nvivo because it allowed for a combination 
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of manual and automatic coding through which emerging hypotheses can be 
tested. I developed codes to reflect the emerging interest in harm reduction. Ini-
tially I coded around common harm reduction terms such as dosing and syringe 
use. As I reviewed and re-coded, I developed more theoretical codes that re-
flected the micro- and macro-contexts shaping harm reduction practice. I then 
examined what sources of advice users trusted and what kinds of information 
they shared related to safer drug using practices. 
As users were discussing illegal activity they took steps to protect their identities. 
Users employed pseudonyms and anonymity was generally treated as the price of 
entry for the forum and users reminded each other not to give out real world in-
formation that could be traced back to them. Generally users did not post such 
information but where they have I have  I altered information in the quotations 
to ensure that there is no real world information on criminal activity. The study 
was approved under the School of Social and Political Science (University of Edin-
burgh) ethics procedure. 
In this article I use  anonymous data posted on a cryptomarket. There are inher-
ent limits to looking at forum posts. 99% of posts are by 1% of users so this 
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small group of users dominate the posts and it is difficult to access other possi-
bly dissenting voices.  The majority of cryptomarket users are interested in buying 
drugs not in making posts so the data mainly comes from small, possibly atypi-
cal, groups of site users.   
Findings 
Structuring of risk 
There are four structuring axes which involve culture, chemistry, legal/policy con-
text and market structure. The Market forum gave people a way of articulating 
and addressing  risks on each axis. Culture I framed as involving at one end nor-
malisation and the other pathologisation of certain drug types and forms of use  
(Barratt et al, 2014a). Chemistry I defined as those effects attributed to the phar-
macological characteristics of the drug and its interaction with the user, which 
can range from potentially dangerous but possibly rewarding potency to drugs 
that are attributed with manageable and predictable qualities (Bancroft and Scott 
Reid, 2016). Users paid attention to the legal and policy context and its implica-
tions for risks from law enforcement activity (Aldridge and Askew, 2017).  The 
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market infrastructure was also carefully analysed by them, comparing with other 
markets to asses its reliability and trustworthiness of market actors and architec-
ture (Beckert and Dewey, 2017). Each axis is embedded in different ways in the 
cryptomarkets, the wider digital infrastructures and associated systems, and na-
tional and international policy structures and cultures.  
Cultural normalisation of use and supply has been identified as part of recrea-
tional drug cultures in the UK and more widely (Coomber et al, 2015; Measham 
and Shiner, 2009). It is the case on the cryptomarkets that many users operate in 
normalised drug cultures and see drug use as functional fun (Askew, 2016). In 
these cases risk is identified with uncontrolled use. However many users are more 
isolated, and their drug use does not correspond to the picture of drug use legit-
imated by a time and space bounded, recreational purpose. Many heroin users 
on the forums describe isolated circumstances and daily use which is not part of 
a shared recreational culture that can provide a normalising narrative for their 
drug use. In those cases the forums were the main focus of shared reflection and 
discussion of drug use for them. They discussed pathologisation risks such as 
stigma and the requirement for secrecy and the need to combine drug use with 
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work and family life with non-drug users. As this user described peer harm reduc-
tion was an aim but was hampered by the isolation and stigma many users expe-
rience: 
And to [user] hanoi: I feel you man. It sucks having to keep quiet about 
it, makes it really hard for the average person to get quality harm‐ re-
duction information. But when you don't keep quiet about it you get 
estranged from so many people you knew and loved and the binge 
continues. We are not terrible junkies huddled between trash bins 
shaking and looking dirty and pathetic without a thought in our head 
besides who we need to rob to get our next fix. No, I want that per-
ception to change, and the best way to try to get that to happen is to 
advocate for more responsible drug use from my fellow drug lovers. 
Opiates/heroin is, in my opinion, one of the greatest drugs in the 
world, a true gift from ‘god’. It should be respected and used responsi-
bly, not abused and taken for granted, or it will fuck up your world. Fo-
rum user ‘Allysbaba’. 
 15 
This image of the responsible user turned up constantly in users’ conversations. 
Users are implored by each other to act smartly and treat the drug with respect 
in relation to chemistry related risks. These are identified as stemming from the 
drug’s potency, addictive qualities, pharmacokinetic action and interactions with 
other drugs and medications. Users can involve themselves in extreme drug use 
binges as long as they are temporary, and they are aware of what to expect and 
how to manage it without having to resort to a visit to hospital or involve other 
kinds of personal or legal trouble. Legal risks arose from law enforcement action. 
This was factored into the risk infrastructure as a risk that could be manageable 
with the right intelligence about law enforcement agencies. For example, that 
they prioritised particular drugs or user types as in the following posting. 
 You must have a super supply of will power if you've been an O 
[opium] chipper [user] for 7 years! O is extremely addictive just like the 
other opiates. I'm not trying to talk you into continuing your journey, 
but I feel you because from the sound of your post, I'm on the same 
journey. Making your own O is so much better and safer than having 
to risk coins every time you make a darknet purchase, not to mention 
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you're putting your life in the hands of the vendor in a way. Look what 
happened to Phillip Seymour Hoffman. Plus less risk with LE [law en-
forcement]. And I would think O would be less taxing on your liver, 
kidneys and the rest of your body, since it's all plant based and no 
added chemical fillers... at least that's my experience with O. Forum 
user ‘spangledust’ 
Spangledust writes about making your own opioids as a way of reducing risk of 
law enforcement attention.  
Users identified market risks from the use of Bitcoin, the peer to peer payment 
system used in cryptomarkets, and the market escrow process used to guarantee 
sales. Bitcoin is a highly volatile currency. One of the ways of ensuring trusted 
transactions in the market was for the administrator to keep Bitcoin in escrow un-
til the drugs were delivered, only releasing them when the buyer confirmed, or 
after a set period of time which vendors did not like. There was in the posting 
talk about the good etiquette involved in releasing payment when goods arrived 
and not delaying payment until the last possible moment.Currency volatility 
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meant that the bitcoin could have a very different value by this point. Some ven-
dors had a ‘finalise early’ option to reduce the risk of losses due to currency fluc-
tuations or to the market closing as the result of an ‘exit scam’;  the market ad-
ministrator leaving with the vendors’ and users’ bitcoin. The ‘finalise early’ option 
involved the release of the customer’s Bitcoin as soon as the deal is agreed. This 
minimised the risks of the cryptomarket failing or going offline before the trans-
action was complete. However this option transfers market risk from the vendor 
to  the customer whose only recourse if the drugs fail to arrive is to leave a bad 
review or criticise the vendor on the forum. A high level of trust is required for fi-
nalise early to work. Market risks were also recognised by other users as stem-
ming from phishing (falsely obtaining private information) or other predatory 
criminal activity that targeted cryptomarket users. 
In their posts, users dissect and discuss risks in terms of each of these four di-
mensions . Users updated each other continually on what risks applied where and 
how to manage or mitigate them. The different risks were produced in different 
structural contexts. Normalisation developed through local drug use cultures and 
the varied acceptance of different drug types and use contexts and involved both 
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drug users and non-users. Chemical risks emerged in the process of drug pro-
duction and the user’s personal drug history so these risks were recognised as 
being embedded in biography as well as pharmacology. Legal and policy risks 
were shaped by the structure of drug prohibition, surveillance systems the user 
was exposed to and the priorities of law enforcement agencies. Market risks 
worked through the process of drug buying as an exchange and as an economic 
system which was located in the structure of the cryptomarket payment, escrow 
and review systems. Each dimension worked at a different interface. Users talked 
about these harms as arising at these different  interfaces and discussed harm re-
duction practice as taking responsibility for risks and harms at each interface. 
Peer support 
An example of peer support was the way site users shared on-line detailed expe-
riences about heroin injecting techniques, how to avoid infection and accesses, 
and how to diagnose and cope with some of the immediate physical effects of 
injecting such as bruising. There were many sources of peer support, from those 
of experienced users to vendors. Some vendors provided harm reduction infor-
mation with the drugs they sold but this was relatively basic content. The main 
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sources of information for users were in the market forums and from other users. 
Cryptomarket forums use structural peer rating features that allowed users to be 
promoted because of their positive interactions with others and provision of 
harm reduction support. Silk Road had its ‘Karma’ rating, and Merkat similarly has 
user ratings for dependability, mimicking feudal chivalry (Chevalier, Scutifer and 
so on). Being active in the forums and posting harm reduction advice is one of 
the criteria for being nominated for these recognised roles. 
Many users saw it as important that others should be aware of the particular 
characteristics of the different products on offer. Some tested samples and 
posted the results on the forum: 
I'm as transparent as possible about the tests and always disclose if the 
sample has been bought anonymously or given by the vendor. Theo-
retically double blind tests would be best but that isn't feasible at this 
point. Please decide for yourself if you want to use the information or 
not. I refrain from publicly giving comments on cocaine vendors, their 
shipping methods and their products. I will only post the lab test re-
sults. There is no lab documentation available for the cocaine that has 
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been tested, the lab results are only provided verbally. The only way to 
be sure what your powder consists of is to get it tested yourself. Fo-
rum user ‘Bugout’ 
As this user and other users acknowledged, some of the tests were based on free 
samples provided by vendors in the hope of garnering positive feedback. Many 
of those users who posted tests stated explicitly that it as part of their commit-
ment to making the cryptomarkets work as a community that was capable of 
identifying and managing drug related risks. As one said ‘we all have an interest 
in drugs, wether selling, buying, researching chemically’ (tester HiKite). 
Much of the discussion of drug safety in the Merkat forum was not explicitly 
badged as such. Users tended not to head for discussion threads on harm reduc-
tion or drug safety to discuss problems. They raised them in other threads on the 
forum, for example as part of discussions about drug quality, about how to use a 
particular product effectively, and the quality of particular vendors. 
Peer support discussions covered various practical problems. Complaints ex-
tended to the general postal and service infrastructure that affected the speed of 
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deliveries,  scamming by vendors, and having shipments intercepted by customs. 
Scamming by vendors was not a typical interaction but it was an anticipated risk. 
Problems were attributed on a combination of naïve ‘noob’ (new and inexperi-
enced) users and weak or duplicitous management of the site. Other cryptomar-
ket administrators could and did steal from customers and vendors (Duxbury and 
Haynie, 2017; Soska and Christin, 2015). During the study several similar sites fell 
prey to theft by administrators, or were suspected as having been set up for that 
purpose in the first place. There are claims that one site had many staff involved 
in filleting Bitcoin from buyers and sellers who they could then plausibly claim 
were scammers themselves. 
The effect of the various postings was to create counter-narratives in opposition 
to prevailing characterisations of drug users (Maddox et al. 2016). Forum users 
challenged the distinction between good and bad drugs. One heroin user shared 
his experience of his girlfriend who was a regular cannabis user looking down on 
him for his intravenous drug use. Users recognised the structural context of 
stigma that made it difficult to obtain harm reduction information and challenge 
the stigma that applied to injecting drug users. 
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Hello all my underground friends and law enforcement agents who got 
nothing better to do than watch us citizens safely navigate the e-‐
blackmarket and exchange information and anecdotes about which 
vendors are legit, our experiences with a variety of chemicals, and 
safety/harm reduction. Forum user ‘ProfWhite’ 
Users also discussed the ways in which the design and working of the darknet it-
self mitigated risk and stigma. Many users discussed how they felt much safer 
and less stigmatised purchasing and interacting with vendors through the market. 
They reported much more respectful and businesslike interactions with vendors 
than that which was felt to characterise offline markets. They felt most positively 
towards forum threads when they operated as a community. 
It's so nice that everyone here can talk openly, not be judged, help 
each other, provide tips and harm reduction tricks -‐  even provide 
each other with some Bitcoin when they're short -‐  it really is a beauti-
ful thing. :) I trust the people in this thread and they know they can 
trust me, so it's just a great feeling to be able to rely on others here. 
Forum user ‘TrumPet’ 
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For this group of users, harm reduction was a community focused activity that in-
volved a range of risks from the potential dangers associated with using the drug 
itself to the legal and social threats of personal exposure, shaming and stigma. 
Risk signalling and responsible harm 
A drug’s potential danger could be taken as a sign of potency and effectiveness.  
Users incorporated the ability to manage what were perceived as more potent 
drugs into their drug use as a badge of experience. Users emphasises ‘educated 
choices’ in their  normalised, risk-savvy approach to drug use.  Such choices in-
volved  acting independently of both government sanctioned claims about blan-
ket drug risk, and also of vendors’ boasting about their product. The ‘educated 
user’ has the ability to consume responsibly, with self-reflection and awareness 
which would manage the risk as in the following post: 
Buy some (House Lannister and Platinum Standard for me). Test it. 
Take it only if you are educated enough, conscious enough, and self 
aware enough to take it responsibly. Make sure you know how the 
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meds that you take on the regular will be effected. Forum user ‘Tod-
dUnctous’ 
In site users posts there was a move away from the idea of risk as an assessment 
of potential harm to risk as a manageable, normal challenge that comes about in 
the course of obtaining and using drugs. The educated user would have the 
‘right stuff’, the right personal characteristics to manage risk before, during and 
after taking the drug and incorporate expected harms into their drug use biog-
raphy. In these posting the locus of risk was shifted from the drug and drug con-
sumption process to the market structures and the operation of the market as a 
social process. Users who made points similar to those made by ToddUnctous 
were showing how aware they were of the market as a social infrastructure and 
risk as produced through this infrastructure. They acknowledged a range of po-
tential harms related to the drug trade and drug consumption. For them respon-
sible harm meant an approach that recognised that harm could only be mini-
mised so far and that allowed for harm to exist as a likelihood in every user’s 
drug use biography. 
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Users drew on a variety of sources for harm reduction advice beyond the Merkat 
forum. These include open internet sites such as Reddit and Erowid, harm reduc-
tion services and directly from the scientific literature. In their posting many users 
showed that they were familiar with current academic research. Users posts drew 
on expert knowledge  but the did not cite the authority of experts in their assess-
ment of the trustworthiness of advice given or received. This may reflect the suc-
cess of public health harm reduction initiatives as  a lot  good practice was taken 
for granted such as using clean needles and properly preparing injecting works 
accepted as normal.  
Users’ claims to responsible harm involved putting the harms of illicit drugs in 
the context of other harms they were exposed to and taking responsibility for 
harms caused by their drug use. One way of doing this was to draw comparisons 
between harms from illicit drugs with those of prescribed or over the counter 
medicines. Another was to emphasise that the harm caused was limited to the 
drug user and did not affect others, as one user indicted in a post: 
This is probably the 3rd or 4th time I've done cocaine. I think nitrous 
oxide and ibuprofen have probably done more damage to my brain 
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and body than any cocaine/cut I've snorted in the past year. Forum 
user ‘flame&citron’ 
Users recognised the association between chemical strength, risk and desire, for 
example a more unpredictable drug could also be more effective and desirable.. 
Such association is also recognised and evident in the advertising of pharmaceu-
tical and alcohol companies (Gunter et al, 2010). For users drugs that were char-
acterised as ‘dangerous’ were also often  powerful. The talked about potency as  
a sign of both risk and of quality. There  counter-public health discourse involved 
a narrative that was somewhat different from the public health harm reduction 
narrative.. For the educated and informed user, harm reduction practice extended 
beyond avoiding harm to more effective and safe use of multiple drugs. An ad-
vantage of the darknet was that users could obtain a great variety of drugs, in 
varying strengths and forms. Some presented this as a form of  harm reduction. 
For example, using smokeable heroin to preserve a low tolerance, or using 
kratom to mitigate the effects of opiate withdrawal.  
Users posts often linked personal good health and work success with being a a 
responsible user as in the following post by hot4teacher: 
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So I got all the equipment (bulk syringes, needles, micron filters, alcohol 
swabs, tourniquet, sterile storage vials, sterile water for injection, BA, hand 
sanitizer for disinfection), put a using schedule into effect (no more then 3 
days in a row and never during a workweek) and then got some nice #4. 
That was about 2 months ago and since then I have used pretty much every 
weekend. So far I have not had even the slightest inkling of physical w/d 
symptoms. … My job hasn’t suffered the slightest (due to get a permanent 
contract along with a raise), I exercise regularly, eat healthy and continue to 
loose weight. And I actually learned a few things about medicine and phar-
macology in order to be able to enjoy myself as much as I do using heroin 
while exercising a very high degree of harm reduction. But thats of course 
just the story of one person. Forum user ‘hot4teacher’ 
There was in user posts a difference between the techniques of harm reduction 
and the narrative of better, safer use. For example, users referred to the complex-
ities of interactions between drugs and the body and how these could be used to 
maintain heroin use and manage it using a range of supplementary drugs. For 
 28 
many users the cryptomarkets are one source of such drugs. The could also ob-
tain such drugs through the street market or acquaintances willing to sell, swap 
or give their prescriptions as loosenutz wrote: 
Methadone. Used to help wean addicts off heroin, but a very powerful 
opiate itself, some refer to it as pure evil, because of the terrible, pain-
ful, months long withdrawal symptoms you can experience if you abuse 
and become addicted to it. ‘dones [methadones] are much better for 
recreational use than other opiates that are used to wean addicts off 
heroin in my opinion, such as suboxone. I would take about 10-15mg 
and I would get a mild euphoric buzz and I always noticed it seemed 
to come in waves. It can knock your ass out tho if you take too much, I 
remember being scared I was dying one time when I used it, hah. Fo-
rum user ‘loosenutz’ 
Users discussed how drugs that were prescribed to control addiction and prevent 
pleasure such as methadone and suboxone could be re-used to attain pleasure 
and manage harm, for example by combining them with heroin and other opiates 
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as part of a drug use repertoire. Suboxone is prescribed as an addiction treat-
ment. Users noted how useful the drug was for work. It operated in a slow way, 
tended to stay in the body, but did not have the debilitating qualities sometimes 
ascribed to methadone. GrimeReaper’s post  showed an understanding of what 
drug effects were and how to successfully combine them for example that subox-
one is a partial antagonist as it contains naloxone 
I use very small amounts of sub in my hits. I am a little ashamed to ad-
mit, because it is sooo bad for you, and the mark of a worthless junkie, 
but I crush up the pill and IV it. But this is how little I use, I can make 1 
of those 8mg pills last a week if I keep myself relatively under control. 
Forum user ‘GrimeReaper’ 
In their posts users of opium derived drugs discussed how these drugs could 
substitute for each other in some ways and not in others, and how this was tied 
to the relative risks they presented. For example, heroin was fast acting and pow-
erful but also presented a risk of addiction. That could be mitigated by using 
other drugs that worked more slowly, or which combined opioid agonists and 
antagonists. This attribute could be a positive. Users indicated that they could  
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manage drug dependence by moving from injecting to smoking, or from heroin 
to opium, substituting other drugs as needed. Their posts indicated a complex 
understanding of the ways in which drug use history, personal biography, the 
user’s body and the drug molecule and delivery system interacted to produce 
particular effects, some of which they felt were were desirable , others  had to be 
mitigated.   
Discussion 
Cryptomarkets have become meeting points where different kinds of knowledge 
can be combined and validated (van Hout and Hearne, 2016). They develop a risk 
infrastructure that provides technical tools, shared knowledge, and shareable 
judgements to manage risk. Cryptomarkets when they work as advertised are 
protective against law enforcement surveillance, predatory dealers and third party 
theft and enabling of drug use that is purposeful and pleasurable, or self-medi-
cating, or for coping with life stresses.  There were multiple framings of harm re-
duction, as avoiding punitive measures and moralising discourse (Keane, 2003), 
and incorporating and promoting the voice of users (Friedman et al 2007; Pauly, 
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2008). As Munsgaard et al., (2017) state, cryptomarket forums are a place where 
users can define the ‘normative context’ for drug exchange and use.  
In their posts, users focussed more on harm management in this context, advo-
cating complex drug use repertoires grounded in different sources of knowledge 
about drug effects. Some users claimed to use ‘expert’ knowledge derived from 
the scientific literature whereas others used personal experience or the reported 
experience of others. They discussed the ways that drugs typically prescribed for 
medical management purposes such as naloxone or methadone could be re-
tasked for more involved harm management processes and for pleasure. This is 
typical of the way drug users routinely incorporate harm reduction into their drug 
using practice (Friedman et al, 2007). Users are a source of lay expertise for oth-
ers (Jauffret-Roustide, 2009), they develop and share protective strategies {Harris 
and Rhodes, 2013}, and provide care and support (Drumm et al, 2005). Users are 
producers of knowledge about harm reduction that can augment, run ahead of, 
and challenge that of experts. 
 32 
Many of the findings mirror others about harm management serving broader 
purposes of community building (Gowan et al 2012). User priorities are not nec-
essarily those of mainstream public health which was sometimes seen as prioritis-
ing more abstract risks over immediate threats to the user (Harris and Rhodes 
2012). Their discussion moves the focus of harm reduction from responsibilisation 
and discipline (Moore, 2009) to building on community and self-care (Gowan, 
2012). Users are able to adapt medications used for harm reduction to their own 
needs. Faulkner-Gurnstein (2017) outlines how naloxone was initially seen by its 
manufacturers and public health experts as a technical quick fix to be adminis-
tered by medical personnel. Users in this way it induced rapid withdrawal in users 
which was perceived by them as a form of punishment. When they were able to 
access and administer it themselves users had adapted it and used it as a self-
help tool. Such user driven changes in the cultural context are typical of how it 
and other medications such as naloxone and subutex are discussed on the cryp-
tomarkets. 
In on-line discussions some risk factors change or are missing. Risks from pur-
chasing the drug are shifted. There is still the risk that having paid for the drug it 
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is not delivered, which appears to be like being cheated. However the difference 
is there is some comeback. The buyer can dispute the order with the market ad-
ministrator. That may or may not lead to satisfaction. It does change the emo-
tional texture of the experience. The buyer is not at risk of a humiliating like it or 
leave it situation, so the power differential has altered somewhat. 
This forum create a set of shared systems, tools and knowledge practices that 
give meaning to and are used to manage risk behaviour: a risk infrastructure. In it 
users challenge prevailing ‘expert’ risk narratives thus produce a counter-public 
health. Counter-public health has a long history, under various labels, of examin-
ing the formation of health and risk management strategies and of political activ-
ism by counter-publics, meaning those marginalised communities exposed to risk 
(Epstein, 1996; Robins, 2004). It describes the logic of collective action around risk 
behaviours that emerges from peer-to-peer communication. It focuses attention 
on the formation of risk priorities and practices that address health risks but have 
priorities that differ from and sometimes challenge those of formal public health. 
For example, there are individuals who prioritise pleasure over stopping risky ac-
tivities (Hunt et al, 2007), that challenge predominant individualising narratives of 
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the meaning of risky behaviour (Bourgois and Schonberg, 2007).  This challenging 
can  produce new knowledge that may add to or overturn existing scientific risk 
paradigms and develop alternative peer-to-peer harm minimisation techniques 
(Decorte, 2001; Van Hout and Bingham, 2014). These communities form and are 
formed from political engagement to varying degrees. The original Silk Road was 
a site of political and philosophical discussion which is less evident in the markers 
that have replaced it as the  users of the new cryptomarkets become more driven 
by concerns about security and usability (Munksgaard and Demant, 2016). 
Seen in this way, cryptomarkets become the location for shared knowledge pro-
duction formed around potential drug risks. They link to the wider ‘demimonde’ 
of alternative communities (Maddox et al, 2016) whereby participants enact alter-
native value structures and create protocols and knowledge sets in relation to 
drug exchange and use (Munksgaard and Demant, 2016). Cryptomarkets are par-
ticularly interesting as they are both a mode of obtaining drugs and are at least 
in principle designed to promote professional and accountable transactions and 
interactions between buyers and users (Barrat et al, 2016). The design and use of 
cryptomarkets can be seen as a response to the generation and distribution of 
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risks through drug prohibition and the discursive stigmatisation of them. They al-
low drug users to take risks and introduce deliberation and comparison into the 
drug buying process. There is co-production of harm reduction information and 
practice in the cryptomarkets between vendors, users and harm reduction experts 
who contribute to some forums. Some cryptomarkets also allow for some co-pro-
duction of harm reduction products. For example, the Alphabay market encour-
aged vendors to provide the opioid agonist naloxone by waiving the vendor 
bond for those who did (Gilbert and Dasgupta, 2017). 
The users of cryptomarkets can be seen as setting up an alternative, counter 
power structure to frame and manage risk which gives weight to the structural, 
political and legal factors which create risks for them (Munksgaard and Demant, 
2016). This draws on and integrates some important insights from public health 
and harm reduction but also challenges some of the values implicit in them, es-
pecially the idea of harm reduction and risk minimisation. Responsible harm is a 
useful way of thinking about these processes by providing an avenue for the ar-
ticulation and analysis of user evaluation, minimisation and accounting for harm.  
The cryptomarket enables some users to make informed choices about the risks 
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they want to take. Responsible harm meant constructing a risk agenda that incor-
porates some controlled risk but allows for a degree of unpredictability in drug 
taking. So although users are motivated by harm reduction, they also question 
some of its implications. Constructive risk taking to create a context which is sup-
portive/controlled.  In postings on the site users invert some of the priorities of 
risk management by mainstream discourse about drugs and harm reduction doc-
trine.  
Conclusion  
Competing ideas of harm exist under the same term. Harm reduction necessarily 
has to accommodate with competing political agendas. It emerged from and is 
sustained by activists, users and communities and explicitly concerns values as 
part of health (Boucher et al 2017). Cryptomarkets do not remove risk but do 
they do reconfigure harm. Structural associations may still exist for example, users 
may still have to engage in sex work to obtain money and expose themselves to 
attendant vulnerabilities. A user who earns cash through sex work and exchanges 
it for heroin is not in a position to leave that complex set of negotiations and 
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obligations and simply ‘buy it on the darknet’. So there are strict limits to the 
cryptomarkets’ harm reduction potential to transform the power relationships 
that exist in the offline drug market. Indeed the offline market may serve existing 
users adequately in many situations. We should also move beyond background 
assumptions that the ‘street’ is automatically more risky and has no inherent ad-
vantages (Abel and Fitzgerald, 2012). The potential of the cryptomarkets is to de-
link some of these overlapping structural elements. A key change is the separa-
tion of drug distribution from other environments, for example, from sexual ex-
change, nightclubs, and shooting galleries. New inequalities emerge. Users need 
resources to access cryptomarkets such as stable address for drug delivery, inter-
net access and use skills or access to people who have them. One of the changes 
the cryptomarkets wrought is in relative power between different groups of users 
and vendors. Power has not gone away. Administrators have a great deal and 
there is suspicion of extensive collusion between them and vendors. Having said 
that, the relative dis-embedding from existing contexts that cryptomarkets have 
engineered does allow for users to combine a greater range of knowledge 
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sources when they examine risk and harm in relation to specific products on of-
fer. They are also able to articulate narratives of drug use that resist stigmatisa-
tion, pathologisation, and criminalisation. The benefits of the cryptomarkets 
therefore extend from being a novel form of illicit drug distribution and into their 
ability reconfigure the cultural meaning and recognition of drug use. 
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